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Investors’ Trash, Taxpayers’ Treasure:  The Banco 
Popular Wipeout and Contingent Convertible Bonds 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
One man’s trash is another man’s treasure.  The old adage applies 
to the banking and finance industry and there is no better instrument to 
illustrate this adage than the volatile contingent convertible bond.  
Contingent convertible bonds (“CoCo bonds”) are hybrid debt 
instruments.1  Once the issuing bank’s capital ratios fall below a certain 
threshold or regulators determine it is appropriate, the bond is converted 
into stock for the bondholder or written down if the bank needs to raise 
its capital levels.2  These bonds have enticed investors due to their 
attractively high yields.3  However, recent events show that the yields 
may not be worth the risk to bondholders, but could be invaluable to 
taxpayers.4  CoCo bonds came about after the 2008 financial crisis and 
were designed as part of a global regulatory shift to prevent banks from 
needing taxpayer-funded bailouts.5  Both the Third Basel Accord (“Basel 
 
 1. Oscar Williams-Grut, Here’s What CoCo Bonds Are and Why Investors Are Freaking 
Out About Them, BUSINESS INSIDER (Feb. 11, 2016, 4:11 AM), http://www.business 
insider.com/what-are-coco-bonds-2016-2. 
 2. See Banco Popular: First European AT1 Hybrid (CoCo) Triggered, BONDADVISER 
(June 15, 2017), http://www.bondadviser.com.au/blog/banco-popular-first-european-at1-
hybrid-coco-triggered/ [hereinafter BONDADVISER] (“CoCos are the equivalent of post-
transitional Australian Bank Additional Tier 1 (AT1) Hybrids which carry Capital and Non-
Viability Triggers. They pay discretionary coupons and carry the potential (Capital and Non-
Viability Triggers) to be converted into shares if the bank’s capital ratios fall below a certain 
threshold, making them the first capital holders (behind equity investors) to be wiped out in a 
bank failure.”); see also Erica Jeffery, AT1 Capital/CoCo bonds: What You Should Know, 
EUROMONEY (Nov. 24, 2017), https://www.euromoney.com/article/b12kqjlwvsz26k/at1-
capitalcoco-bonds-what-you-should-know (“[CoCo bonds] contain a contractual provision to 
convert into ordinary shares or are [written down] if a bank needs to raise its capital levels, 
once the CET1 ratio threshold has been breached, or if authorities determine the issuer has 
reached the point-of-non-viability (PONV).”). 
 3. See Williams-Grut, supra note 1 (describing the typical high yields carried by CoCo 
bonds and the two-fold effect the design is intended to have). 
 4. See Williams-Grut, supra note 1 (discussing investors’ growing fears in aspects of 
the bond, such as missed interest payments). 
 5. See Williams-Grut, supra note 1 (“Coco bonds were cooked up after the financial 
crisis as a way to prevent banks from needing any more state bailouts.”). 
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III”) and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act (“Dodd-Frank”) responded to the crisis by setting capital and 
liquidity requirements to manage the risk of systemically important 
financial institutions (“SIFIs”).6  Should capital and liquidity 
requirements prove incapable of solving the too big to fail problem, 
however, the concept of contingent capital appears to serve as an 
appealing alternative.7  Debt that converts to equity contingent on signs 
of institutional failure would ideally serve a two-fold purpose:  it lessens 
the bank’s debt burden while boosting its capital.8  The conversion of debt 
into equity is triggered by the institution coming under financial stress, 
and is designed to prevent the need to bail out failing institutions by 
creating a bail-in alternative that imposes losses on bondholders rather 
than taxpayers.9  The recent acquisition of Banco Popular by rival Banco 
Santander SA (“Santander”) in June 2017 was the first time these 
instruments foisted losses on the bondholders and serves as the first 
illustration for investors and institutions alike of CoCo bonds being put 
to the test.10  As the recent failure of Banco Popular revealed, CoCo bonds 
 
 6. See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL III: A GLOBAL REGULATORY 
FRAMEWORK FOR MORE RESILIENT BANKS AND BANKING SYSTEMS 2 (2010), http://
www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf (“The Basel Committee is raising the resilience of the banking 
sector by strengthening the regulatory capital framework . . . .”); see also Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) § 171, 12 U.S.C. § 5371 (2016) 
(setting leverage and risk-based capital requirements).  Basel III mandates a phase-in of 
increased capital ratios. The rationale is that increase in capital provides greater cushion to 
absorb losses so that the larger the cushion, the more losses the institution can assume before 
reaching insolvency.  See LISSA L. BROOME & JERRY W. MARKHAM, REGULATION OF BANK 
FINANCIAL SERVICE ACTIVITIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 561 (4th ed. 2011) (“Areas of 
emphasis included raising the quality of Tier 1 capital, introducing a leverage ratio, . . . 
implementing a liquidity coverage ratio to ensure that the institution has sufficient liquidity 
to survive one month of acute stress, promoting build-up of capital in good times so that it 
could be drawn upon in times of stress, and requiring higher capital or risk weights to capture 
the risks of complex trading activities and securitization exposures.”).  Congress continued 
the renewed emphasis on capital in the Dodd-Frank Act.  LISSA L. BROOME & JERRY W. 
MARKHAM, REGULATION OF BANK FINANCIAL SERVICE ACTIVITIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 
562 (4th ed. 2011). 
 7. See Williams-Grut, supra note 1 (“Coco bonds were cooked up after the financial 
crisis as a way to prevent banks from needing any more state bailouts.”). 
 8. Williams-Grut, supra note 1. 
 9. See Williams-Grut, supra note 1 (Explaining that “rather than the bank owing you 
money, you suddenly own a little bit of the bank[,]” which is “a way to prevent banks from 
needing any more state bailouts.”). 
 10. See Robert Smith, Coco Bond Contagion Contained After Banco Popular Wipeout, 
FIN. TIMES (June 7, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/1b26153a-4b7c-11e7-a3f4-c742b 
9791d43 (discussing the sudden collapse of Banco Popular’s CoCo bonds as the first instance 
losses have been imposed on AT1 bondholders and that the CoCo bond contagion was 
successfully contained after the wipeout of Banco Popular). 
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appear to be successful in absorbing some loss suffered by the issuer,11 
but overall, fall short in rescuing an institution from failure and should 
not be relied on to do so.12   
This Note discusses how the recent acquisition of Banco Popular 
and its CoCo bonds’ wipeout is revealing of the fundamental 
characteristics and functions of the instrument through discussion of four 
major areas of the contingent convertible bond.  First, the bonds’ one-
time conversion may be inadequate to prevent failure;13 second, there is 
a lack of uniformity in CoCo bonds’ trigger mechanism;14 third, 
conversion of CoCo bonds contributes to increasing market uncertainty 
and contagion;15 and finally, CoCo bonds encompass certain inherent 
risks for investors unlike any other type of bond instrument.16  As such, 
these CoCo bonds, or Additional Tier 1 (“AT1”) securities,17 may be 
inherently risky, exotic high-yield bonds in and of themselves and are 
likely not dependable in offering systemic protection to financial 
institutions.18  Capital rules and regulatory requirements must be globally 
consistent to ensure a level playing field and to avoid regulatory 
arbitrage.19  Further, there is a need for uniformity in the bonds’ loss-
absorption mechanism and greater investor knowledge of the risks that 
come with the bonds.20   
 
 11. See id. (“The sudden collapse in the value of Banco Popular’s bonds has been 
dramatic.  Its now worthless €1.25bn of Additional Tier 1 bonds were still trading at about 
half of face value before the bank’s resolution and takeover by rival Santander was announced 
on Wednesday morning.  This is the first time losses have been imposed on AT1 
bondholders.”). 
 12. See BONDADVISER, supra note 2 (describing the auctioning of Banco Popular initiated 
by the European Central Bank, the entity that deemed Popular “failing or likely to fail” and 
called for a point of non-viability trigger of the bank’s CoCos). 
 13. See infra Part IV.A. 
 14. See infra Part IV.B. 
 15. See infra Part IV.C. 
 16. See infra Part IV.D. 
 17. See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 6, at 12, 15 (setting out 
details of Additional Tier 1 capital as a method of strengthening the global capital framework). 
 18. See Thomas Hale, Credit Ratings Bolster Risky Bank Bonds, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 8, 
2015), https://www.ft.com/content/98c41bd0-562e-11e5-a28b-50226830d644 (“Exotic, 
high-yielding bank bonds developed in the aftermath of the financial crisis are increasingly 
attracting investment grade credit ratings, a category that allows big institutional investors to 
buy such debt.”). 
 19. INT’L SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES ASS’N, INC., THE BASEL III TIMELINE (2015), https://
www.isda-iq.org/2015/10/16/the-basel-iii-timeline/. 
 20. See infra Part V. 
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This Note proceeds in six parts.  Part II provides a regulatory 
background and describes the impetus behind the creation of CoCo 
bonds.21  Part III introduces the purpose and design of CoCo bonds.22  
Part IV analyzes the aforementioned problem areas of CoCo bonds in the 
context of the Banco Popular wipeout.23  Part V proposes 
recommendations to make uniform the trigger mechanism of the 
instrument.24  Finally, Part VI summarizes the findings and problem areas 
as revealed by Banco Popular’s buyout and concludes this note.25 
II. REGULATORY BACKGROUND AND IMPETUS BEHIND THE CREATION 
OF COCO BONDS 
The 2008 financial crisis revealed the banking sector’s reliance 
on capital bases that were insufficient and poor in quality.26  As a result, 
regulators recognized a need for higher and better quality bank capital.27  
In 2010, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (“the Committee”) 
issued Basel III, a global agreement on banking supervision in response 
to the financial crisis.28  Basel III sets out an international framework for 
liquidity risk measurement, standards, and monitoring, which presents 
the Committee’s reform measures to strengthen the regulation, 
supervision, and risk management of the banking sector.29  In its aim to 
reform “quality, consistency, and transparency of the capital base,”30 the 
 
 21. See infra Part II. 
 22. See infra Part III. 
 23. See infra Part IV. 
 24. See infra Part V. 
 25. See infra Part VI. 
 26. SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP, BASEL III – ADDITIONAL TIER 1 GOING-CONCERN CAPITAL AND 
TIER 2 CAPITAL 1 (2010), https://www.sidley.com/en/insights/newsupdates/2010/12/basel-
iii—additional-tier-1-goingconcern-capital-and-tier-2-capital (explaining the Basel 
Committee’s standards for better quality capital in addressing systemic risks to the banking 
sector). 
 27. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 6, at 2.  The Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision consists of senior representatives of bank supervisory authorities and 
central banks from Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, 
Hong Kong SAR, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the 
Netherlands, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.  BASEL COMM. ON BANKING 
SUPERVISION, supra note 6, at 1 n.1. 
 28. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 6, at 1. 
 29. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 6, at 1. 
 30. ZE’-EV D EIGER ET AL., CONTINGENT CAPITAL SECURITIES: AN OVERVIEW, MORRISON 
& FOERSTER LLP (Apr. 1, 2016), https://content.next.westlaw.com/Document/I8417b230 
1cb111e38578f7ccc38dcbee/View/
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regulatory accord cracks down on risk management by implementing 
more demanding capital and liquidity standards.31  The accord also sets 
forth rules on the type and quality of capital banks must have.32  It 
requires total regulatory capital to include Tier 1 capital, which consists 
of Common Equity Tier 1 (“CET1”) as well as AT1.33  In furthering the 
goals of its regulatory capital requirement, Basel III provides a loss-
absorbency criteria that must be satisfied for non-common equity to be 
classified as Tier 1.34  Non-common equity must be capable of principal 
loss absorption through either conversion to equity in the form of 
common shares at an objective pre-specified trigger point, or principal 
write-down mechanism which allocates losses to the bondholders, also at 
a pre-specified trigger point.35  If these criteria are met, issued CoCo 
Bonds would qualify as AT1 instruments and therefore be considered 
regulatory capital.36  In 2011, the Basel Committee announced that global 
systemically important financial institutions (“G-SIFIs”) would not be 
allowed to use contingent convertible bonds to meet Basel III’s capital 
requirements.37  However, use of contingent capital to meet national loss 
 
FullText.html?originationContext=knowHow&transitionType=KnowHowItem&contextDat
a=(sc.Default)&firstPage=true&bhcp=1. 
 31. Basel III Summary, IBM, https://www.ibm.com/support/knowledgecenter/en/SSN 
364_8.8.0/com.ibm.ima.tut/tut/bas_imp/bas3_sum.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2017) 
(summarizing the provisions of Basel III and specifically, the capital requirements introduced 
to strengthen banks’ capital requirements and introduce more capital buffers). 
 32. INT’L SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES ASS’N, INC., supra note 19. 
 33. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 6, at 12.   
 34. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 6, at 17. 
 35. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 6, at 17.  Per the Basel III 
Accord, contingent convertible bonds do not have to convert in order to meet the Additional 
Tier 1 criteria. However, the accord specifies several criteria for CoCos for inclusion in AT1 
capital, such as, that the CoCos be issued and paid-in, is perpetual, is callable only after a 
minimum of five years, has discretionary dividends/coupon payments, and that any repayment 
of principal must have prior supervisory approval.  BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, 
supra note 6, at 17.  
 36. Jeffery, supra note 2. 
 37. See CADWALADER, WICKERSHAM & TAFT LLP, CLIENTS & FRIENDS MEMO: 
CONTINGENT CONVERTIBLE BONDS AND THE IMPACT OF BASEL III (2011), http://
www.cadwalader.com/uploads/cfmemos/del_6c7bccb69301edb86111be23d5cf8ea2.pdf 
(“An example of these supplementary national requirements is a proposal by the Swiss 
Financial Market Supervisory Authority . . . [which requires] Swiss banks to meet total capital 
ratio requirements of 19 percent. Of this proposed 19 percent total capital ratio, large Swiss 
banks may use CoCos to meet 9 percent of their total capital ratio. The remaining 10 percent 
must be held in the form of common equity, comfortably covering the ‘Basel’ element of the 
capital requirement.”). 
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absorbency requirements supplementing Basel’s loss absorbency 
requirements would be condoned by the Committee.38 
Basel III must be implemented by countries into their own 
national laws in order to be legally binding.39  The Basel Committee 
began phasing in its Basel III requirements in 2013 and full Basel III 
implementation is expected to be finalized in 2019 according to the 
Committee timetable.40 
As for the United States, Dodd-Frank contains provisions relating 
to capital requirements for U.S. banking institutions.41  Specifically, 
Dodd-Frank calls for stricter prudential standards for SIFIs.42  Of the nine 
recommendations for greater regulation, five concern additional capital, 
contingent capital, or liquidity requirements.43  In terms of capital 
requirements, both Dodd-Frank and Basel III provide explicit minimum 
leverage ratios—capital over total assets—along with minimum capital 
ratios—capital over risk-weighted assets.44  Specific to CoCo bonds, 
 
 38. Id. 
 39. EIGER ET AL., supra note 30; see BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., 
BASEL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK (2017), https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/
basel/basel-default.htm (describing Basel III as a comprehensive set of reforms and laying out 
recent updates on the Federal Reserve Board’s proposed rules similar to the requirements of 
Basel III, such as provisions to strengthen the liquidity positions of large financial 
institutions). In the United States, the Federal Reserve Board finalized a rule to implement 
Basel III capital rules in July 2013 to ensure banks maintain strong capital positions by 
increasing both the quantity and quality of capital held by U.S. banking organizations.  BOARD 
OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., BASEL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK (2017), https://
www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/basel/basel-default.htm. 
 40. INT’L SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES ASS’N, INC., supra note 19; see Press Release, Bank 
for Int’l Settlements, Twelfth Progress Report on Adoption of Basel III Standards Published 
by the Basel Comm. (2017), http://www.bis.org/press/p170425.htm (updating readers of the 
adoption status of Basel III standards for each BCBS member jurisdiction as of the end of 
March 2017).  As of the Spring 2017 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s Basel III 
adoption progress report, implementation of standards, such as total loss-absorbing capacity 
(“TLAC”) holdings are underway for member jurisdictions.  Press Release, Bank for Int’l 
Settlements, Twelfth Progress Report on Adoption of Basel III Standards Published by the 
Basel Comm. (2017), http://www.bis.org/press/p170425.htm. 
 41. Dodd-Frank § 115, 12 U.S.C. § 5325 (2016) (requiring the Financial Stability 
Oversight Council to submit a report to Congress regarding a study on contingent capital 
requirements for nonbank financial companies and large bank holding companies).  
 42. See A. PATRICK DOYLE, ET AL., ARNOLD & PORTER LLP, ADVISORY: DODD-FRANK 
ACT MANDATES STRICTER CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS FOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 1 (2010), 
https://files.arnoldporter.com/advisory—dodd-
frank_act_mandates_stricter_capital_requirements_071610.pdf (“[The Dodd-Frank Act] 
imposes a number of more stringent capital requirements. . . .”). 
 43. Id.  The provision including imposition of more stringent capital requirements is set 
forth in the “Collins Amendment” of the Dodd-Frank Act.  Id. 
 44. Kevin F. Barnard & Alan W. Avery, Basel III v. Dodd-Frank: What Does It Mean 
for US Banks, WHO’S WHO LEGAL (Jan. 2011), http://whoswholegal.com/news/features/
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however, Dodd-Frank commissioned a study of the bonds, to be 
commandeered by the Financial Stability Oversight Council (“FSOC”).45  
While its findings were overall inconclusive on CoCo bonds, FSOC 
placed emphasis on its concerns over the trigger mechanism of CoCo 
bond instruments in its final 2012 report.46 
Nevertheless, while there had been discussion between the 
Federal Reserve and the U.S. banking industry to introduce contingent 
capital in U.S. banks in the wake of Basel III, some interpreted a 2011 
speech by then Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner as a sign that the 
United States was no longer seriously considering a contingent 
convertible requirement.47  Moreover, the Federal Reserve’s June 2013 
final rules implementing Basel III in the United States require that the 
paid-in amount of any instrument must classify as equity48 to qualify as 
 
article/28829/basel-iii-v-dodd-frank-does-mean-us-banks/ (highlighting the differences 
between Basel III and Dodd-Frank Act in capital ratio requirements of banks and how they 
conflict in implementation). 
 45. Dodd-Frank §115, 12 U.S.C. § 5325(c) (2016) (setting out specifically what the 
Dodd-Frank Act requires the Financial Stability Oversight Council to study regarding 
contingent capital requirements, such as an evaluation of the amounts of contingent capital 
that should be required of institutions).  
 46. See FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON STUDY OF A 
CONTINGENT CAPITAL REQUIREMENT FOR CERTAIN NONBANK FINANCIAL COMPANIES AND 
BANK HOLDING COMPANIES 19 (2012), https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/studies-
reports/Documents/Co%20co%20study[2].pdf (expounding on the findings of the study 
through a review of the types and structures of contingent capital instruments and its potential 
benefits and drawbacks); see also PAUL GLASSERMAN & ENRICO PEROTTI, THE 
UNCONVERTIBLE COCO BONDS 6 (2017), http://fbf.eui.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/The-
unconvertible-CoCo-bonds-Glasserman-Perotti-March-2017.pdf (discussing the background 
of CoCo bonds and their weakness in their inability to provide going concern convertibility).  
“[T]here are a range of potential issues that could be associated with contingent capital 
instruments, depending on their structure and, in particular, the structure and timing of 
conversion triggers.  Therefore, at this time, the Council recommends that contingent capital 
instruments remain an area for continued private sector innovation. The Council encourages 
the Federal Reserve and other financial regulators to continue to study the advantages and 
disadvantages of including contingent capital and bail-in instruments in their regulatory 
capital frameworks.”  FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, supra note 46, at 19. 
 47. GLASSERMAN & PEROTTI, supra note 46, at 5; see Tim Geithner, Treasury Secretary, 
U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Remarks to the International Monetary Conference (2011), https:/
/www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1202.aspx [hereinafter Treasury 
Secretary Remarks] (“[W]e do not need to impose . . . any of the three other proposed forms 
of additional capital – convertible, bail in, contingent capital instruments, or counter cyclical 
capital requirements.”). 
 48. As according to generally accepted accounting principles (“GAAP”). HAL S. SCOTT, 
CONNECTEDNESS AND CONTAGION: PROTECTING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM FROM PANICS 191 
(MIT Press, 2016) (discussing contingent capital as an alternative resolution system designed 
to resolve the too-big-to-fail problem without public support). 
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Tier 1 capital.49  This thereby precludes contingent convertible debt from 
qualifying prior to conversion.50  A large number of European and Asian 
banks were expected to and do issue CoCo bonds in order to meet capital 
requirements set above the Basel III minimums.51  However, in the United 
States, no banks have issued CoCo bonds to date.52  A major attributing 
reason is the likelihood of unfavorable tax treatment:  CoCo bonds in the 
United States may be treated not as debt, but equity, and thus the interest 
payments would not be tax deductible.53 
Countries have been divided on the issue of whether contingent 
capital is the right tool to deal with ex ante SIFI risk-control and ex post 
failure containment.54  While Europe and the United States have pushed 
for bank taxes as a method of correcting adverse externalities such as 
those arising from excessive risk taking,55 other countries, such as 
Canada, vouch for contingent capital.56  Indeed, officials have conceded 
 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. CADWALADER, supra note 37, at 1; see Paul J. Davies, Investors Diving Into Risky 
Bank Bonds, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 26, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/investors-diving-
into-risky-bank-bonds-1514299178 (“[C]ontingent convertible bonds, or cocos, are mainly 
issued by European and Asian banks. . . .”). 
 52. CADWALADER, supra note 37, at 1. 
 53. See FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, supra note 46, at 7 (“An additional 
drawback, from the perspective of potential issuers, is that depending upon the structure of 
the instrument, the interest payment may not be tax deductible by the issuer, potentially 
resulting in the issuance of a debt instrument that is significantly more costly than typical 
subordinated debt.”); see also Treasury Secretary Remarks, supra note 47 (discussing that in 
the U.S., the largest firms will be required to hold an additional surcharge of common equity 
and that contingent capital will not be imposed on top of that). 
 54. See Viral V. Acharya et al., Capital, Contingent Capital, and Liquidity Requirements, 
REGULATING WALL STREET: THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND THE NEW ARCHITECTURE OF GLOBAL 
FINANCE 144 (Wiley ed., 2010) (discussing the concept of contingent capital in the wake of 
the 2008 financial crisis and potential limitations in its ability to curb taxpayer-funded 
rescuing of failing systemically important financial institutions).  A primary purpose of 
contingent capital is to avoid regulatory bailout after failure (ex post failure).  Id.  However, 
the question remains on whether CoCos can control institutions’ risk-taking before the fact 
(ex ante risk-control).  Id.  
 55. See INT’L MONETARY FUND, A FAIR AND SUBSTANTIAL CONTRIBUTION BY THE 
FINANCIAL SECTOR: FINAL REPORT FOR THE G-20 16 (2010), https://www.imf.org/external/np/
g20/pdf/062710b.pdf (“Specific proposals include . . . taxes on short-term and/or foreign 
exchange borrowing, on high rates of return . . . and for corrective taxes related to notions of 
systemic risks and interconnectedness. The presumption is that receipts from these taxes 
would go to general revenue, although they need not equal the damage—however defined—
that they seek to limit or avert.”). 
 56. Acharya et al., supra note 54, at 168. 
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that implementation and execution of the contingent capital approach had 
to be ironed out and understood before it was feasible.57  
III. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PURPOSE AND DESIGN OF CONTINGENT 
CONVERTIBLE BONDS 
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, banks faced pressure to 
satisfy regulatory capital requirements and sought ways to boost Tier 1 
capital as mandated by increased regulatory requirements.58  CoCo 
bonds, otherwise known as AT1s, are hybrid securities that were designed 
to meet this need by absorbing loss through imposing the brunt of 
institutional failure on the investors that have purchased the CoCo 
bonds.59  The two main features of CoCo bonds is the generation of 
additional common equity capital to strengthen a firm’s ability to absorb 
losses on its balance sheet and to improve incentives for management to 
raise capital when needed.60  These hybrid capital securities absorb losses 
when the capital of the issuing bank falls below a certain level.61  Unlike 
a judicial or administrative restructuring proceeding, contingent capital 
instruments are designated in advance to convert only under a pre-defined 
set of contractual conditions.62  The event of capital falling below a 
certain level “triggers” the bonds where the bonds either automatically 
convert into equity—a debt-for-equity conversion—or the nominal value 
gets written off—a principal write-down.63  Upon the trigger event—
ideally before the institution runs too low on cash—the bonds’ conversion 
then flips the switch so that rather than the bank owing its bondholders 
money, the bondholders own shares of the bank.64  
 
 57. Acharya et al., supra note 54, at 168. 
 58. STEFAN AVDJIEV ET AL., BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS QUARTERLY REVIEW, COCOS: 
A PRIMER 47 (2013), http://www.euromoney.com/Media/documents/shared/euromoney/r 
_qt1309f.pdf (“Over time, as banks felt more pressure from markets and regulators to boost 
their Tier 1 capital, they started to issue CoCos with trigger levels at or above the preset 
minimum for satisfying the going-concern contingent capital requirement.”). 
 59. Id. at 43. 
 60. FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, supra note 46, at 5. 
 61. AVDJIEV ET AL., supra note 58, at 43. 
 62. See SCOTT, supra note 48, at 192–93. 
 63. MICHAEL SCHMID, CREDIT SUISSE, INVESTING IN CONTINGENT CONVERTIBLES 9 
(2014), https://www.credit-suisse.com/media/am/docs/asset_management/events/2014/fits20 
14-program/4-2-schmid-contingent-convertibles.pdf. 
 64. Williams-Grut, supra note 1. 
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This design was intended to create a prophylactic effect of 
heightened market discipline on CoCo bondholders so as to avoid 
shareholder dilution and the potential of bearing economic loss.65  Ideally, 
issued CoCo bonds would have trigger levels at or above the present 
minimum Tier 1 capital requirement in order to satisfy the going-concern 
contingent capital requirement.66  Such a design intends to incentivize 
banks to maintain higher ratios of true economic capital relative to its 
risky assets as management would raise capital in a timely manner such 
that dilutive conversions never occur.67  The implication and design is 
that “too big to fail” financial institutions would not be permitted to 
approach the point of insolvency.68 
In the capital structure of a bank, AT1 CoCo bonds are junior 
bank debt, sitting directly ahead of common equity capital and ranked 
below subordinated debt.69  As “junior” debt, CoCo bonds are not as 
secure as other bonds issued and would be of a lower priority in case of 
a default.70  However, CoCo bonds make up for their risky position in the 
capital structure in providing a significant return advantage—their 
returns, especially from more developed market issuers, by and large 
trump those on other forms of bank debt.71  This is the instrument’s 
 
 65. FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, supra note 46, at 7 (“[The] potential for the 
contingent capital instrument holders to bear economic loss, along with the accompanying 
dilution of the existing common equity holders, could provide incentive to both existing 
holders of common shares and holders of contingent capital instruments to more closely 
monitor the risk and financial performance of the issuer, thus providing additional market 
discipline on the issuer’s behavior.”). 
 66. Jeffery, supra note 2.  
 67. See Charles W. Calomiris & Richard J. Herring, How to Design a Contingent 
Convertible Debt Requirement That Helps Solve Our Too-Big-To-Fail Problem, 25 J. APPLIED 
CORP. FIN. 39, 44–45 (2013) (arguing that CoCos would prevent banks from reaching 
insolvency by recapitalizing long before that point and would resolve the “too-big-to-fail” 
problem). 
 68. See id. (discussing the efficacy of CoCo designs as providing strong incentive to 
strengthen risk management and take remedial measures to raise equity well before they face 
a substantial risk of insolvency). 
 69. Cocos & AT1’s – What, Who and Where?, MACRO & CREDIT MARKET VIEWS BLOG 
(Feb. 19, 2016) http://creditmacro.blogspot.com/2016/02/cocos-at1s-what-who-and-
where.html (illustrating where CoCo bonds/AT1s sit in the capital structure and the four types 
of bond structures and the different outcomes for investors should the banks’ capital fall below 
a pre-defined trigger level). 
 70. Jenny Cosgrave, Do We Need to Worry About CoCo Bonds?, CNBC (Feb. 10, 2016), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2016/02/10/do-we-need-to-worry-about-coco-bonds.html (discussing 
the volatility and liquidity concerns surrounding CoCo bonds by highlighting Deutsche 
Bank’s ability to make coupon payments). 
 71. Id. 
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selling point, making up for its comparatively high risk.72  To illustrate 
the high-yield characteristic of CoCo bonds, the expected return on CoCo 
bonds is currently 5% to 7%, whereas European high-yield bonds are 
offering approximately 4%.73  Unsurprisingly, CoCo bonds are the 
riskiest debt issued by banks.74  Indeed, only a quarter of the CoCo bonds 
in the Eurozone market are judged investment-grade by credit agency 
Fitch.75  Accordingly, retail investors are restricted from involvement in 
certain jurisdictions, such as in the United Kingdom.76  
The pricing of CoCo bonds in primary markets is consistent with 
the proximity to the trigger point.77  The lower the trigger point, the lower 
the loss-absorbing capacity the CoCo bonds will have.78  Consequently, 
the CoCo bonds with low triggers will be less expensive to issue.79  
However, due to regulatory pressures, banks began issuing CoCo bonds 
with trigger levels at or above the present minimum for satisfying the 
going-concern contingent capital requirement.80  As a result, the volume 
of CoCo bonds classified as AT1 capital has increased since the start of 
2012.81  In more recent years, however, the largest category of CoCo 
bonds issued by trigger level falls within conversion at the point of non-
viability (“PONV”), which is effectively gone-concern capital.82  
 
 72. SCHMID, supra note 63, at 13. 
 73. SCHMID, supra note 63, at 13. 
 74. Thomas Hale & Dan McCrum, Why CoCo Bonds are Worrying Investors, FIN. TIMES 
(Feb. 9, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/b75b285c-cf07-11e5-92a1-c5e23ef99c77 
(examining reasons why investors might be worried about buying CoCos, such as issuers’ 
missing coupon payments and concern regarding receiving initial investments back if 
regulators are prohibiting banks from issuing new bonds in order to pay back investors). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id.  The Financial Conduct Authority formalized its ban on the sale of CoCos to retail 
investors, making permanent the temporary ban it had set in place in October 2014.  In its 
policy statement released in June 2015 announcing the decision, the FCA highlighted the 
complex terms of the bonds, such as issuer’s discretion on conversion, timing, effect on 
pricing, currency exchange rate, and conversion rate as risk factors that it found challenging 
for investors to model and price.  Matthew Jeynes, FCA Confirms Retail Distribution Ban on 
CoCo Bonds, FTADVISER (June 12, 2015), https://www.ftadviser.com/2015/06/12/
investments/fixed-income/fca-confirms-retail-distribution-ban-on-coco-bonds-
AGzo0OTRGQhJpiOUKZ5t7L/article.html. 
 77. AVDJIEV ET AL., supra note 58, at 51. 
 78. AVDJIEV ET AL., supra note 58, at 51. 
 79. AVDJIEV ET AL., supra note 58, at 51–52. 
 80. AVDJIEV ET AL., supra note 58, at 47. 
 81. AVDJIEV ET AL., supra note 58, at 47. 
 82. GLASSERMAN & PEROTTI, supra note 46, at 5.  In other words, when conversion is at 
a point of gone-concern capital, the institution is either at or nearing liquidation state, whereas 
conversion at a going concern rate means the trigger point is pre-set at a higher capital ratio 
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By the same token, CoCo bond yields are mainly determined by 
the instrument’s trigger mechanism and the loss-absorption 
mechanism—that is, whether loss is absorbed through a debt-to-equity 
conversion, or a write-down in value.83  The trigger is bifurcated by 
whether it is a mechanical or discretionary trigger, and if mechanical, 
whether determination of the trigger point is accounting-based or market-
based.84  One model—the discretionary model—is favored by the Basel 
Committee and assigns decision-making authority in trigger conversion 
to the issuer’s primary regulator.85  This means that while the 
convertibility is subject to contract, the regulator ultimately has the 
discretion to determine the conditions triggering the convertibility upon 
the regulator finding that the issuer’s financial condition is 
unsatisfactory,86 or trigger the write-down, effectively declaring the 
CoCo bonds at a PONV.87  Another model bases trigger conversion on 
the adequacy of the issuer’s capital ratios.88  A third model takes into 
account market-based variables, such as the issuer’s share price and credit 
spreads, to determine when the instruments convert.89  The latter two 
models are mechanical-based trigger models, distinguishable from the 
first, discretion-based model described.90  The choice of trigger can be 
divided along several dimensions:  high trigger (going concern) or low 
 
such that liquidation is not a significant likelihood in the near future.  See GLASSERMAN & 
PEROTTI, supra note 46, at 5 (“By far the largest category, measured either in dollars or by 
number of banks issuing, specifies conversion at the point of non-viability, which is decidedly 
gone-concern capital.”); see also Business Dictionary, BUSINESSDICTIONARY.COM, http://
www.businessdictionary.com/definition/gone-concern.html (last visited Dec. 30, 2017) 
(defining “gone concern”). 
 83. AVDJIEV ET AL., supra note 58, at 51–52. 
 84. GLASSERMAN & PEROTTI, supra note 46, at 5. 
 85. SCOTT, supra note 48, at 192. 
 86. SCOTT, supra note 48, at 192–93.  Discretionary triggers are otherwise known as 
“point of non-viability” triggers. In particular, supervisors can activate the loss absorption 
mechanism if they believe that such action is necessary to prevent the CoCo-issuing bank’s 
insolvency.  EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, BRIEFING: CONTINGENT CONVERTIBLE SECURITIES, IS A 
STORM BREWING? 4 (May 2016), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/ 
2016/582011/EPRS_BRI(2016)582011_EN.pdf (summarizing the history of CoCos, their 
main characteristics, pros and cons, and recent developments in a briefing by the European 
Parliamentary Research Service). 
 87. See BONDADVISER, supra note 2 (describing that the European Central Bank deemed 
Banco Popular likely to fail, triggering the point-of-non-viability, writing down all existing 
shares, and canceling all AT1 instruments). 
 88. SCOTT, supra note 48, at 193. 
 89. SCOTT, supra note 48, at 193. 
 90. SCOTT, supra note 48, at 193. 
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trigger (gone concern).91  Moreover, the loss absorption mechanism is 
characterized by either a conversion to equity or a principal write-down 
as aforementioned.92  In the case of CoCo bonds that get written down, 
some CoCo bonds may be written down permanently, while others get 
written down temporarily—to be revived if the bank’s capital ratio rises 
again.93  If temporary, the write down is generally reversed if the issuer’s 
financial condition improves.94  Further, the write-off may be complete 
or partial.95  If partial, only the amount needed to restore the issuing 
bank’s regulatory capital ratio above the trigger point converts is written 
down.96 
Therefore, CoCo bonds are multi-dimensional instruments, in 
which all aspects of the instruments’ trigger design factor into the price 
of CoCo bonds as well as what and how much of a yield investors receive 
from CoCo bonds.97  This is just one area of concern surrounding the 
effectiveness of CoCo bonds in absorbing loss and delivering on return 
to investors.  
Finally, CoCo bonds have no maturity date,98 meaning that an 
investor may never get his or her money back.99  Thus, the bonds are 
perpetual, although issuing banks do have the right to exercise a call 
option to repurchase the bonds, but not without prior supervisory 
approval, and only after a minimum of five years.100  Any repayment of 
 
 91. GLASSERMAN & PEROTTI, supra note 46, at 5. 
 92. AVDJIEV ET AL., supra note 58, at 46. 
 93. David Turner, Yield-Hungry Investors Take Their Chances with CoCo Bonds, 
INSTITUTIONAL INV’R (Nov. 19, 2014), http://www.institutionalinvestor.com/article/3402054 
/banking-and-capital-markets-banking/yield-hungry-investors-take-their-chances-with-coco-
bonds.html#.WbmJUoqQyRs (discussing the high-risk nature of CoCos and the investor 
uncertainty due to regulators’ unpredictable discretionary actions to hike risk weights of 
assets). 
 94. FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, supra note 46, at 7. 
 95. SCHMID, supra note 63, at 9. 
 96. FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, supra note 46, at 8.  Alternatively, the terms of 
the instrument could specify a fixed amount of a conversion, write off, or write down upon 
activation of the trigger.  Id. 
 97. AVDJIEV ET AL., supra note 58, at 51–52 (discussing different determinants of CoCo 
pricing). 
 98. Wolf Richter, Deutsche Bank’s CoCo Bonds Speak of Fear of the Worst, WOLF 
STREET, Sept. 16, 2016, https://wolfstreet.com/2016/09/16/deutsche-bank-unglued-again-co-
co-bonds-shares-plunge/ (explaining the impact of regulatory fines imposed on Deutsche 
Bank in 2016 on Deutsche’s CoCo bondholders and how the panic shed light on 
characteristics of the hybrid debt instrument). 
 99. Id. 
 100. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 6, at 16.   
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principal also requires supervisory approval.101  Furthermore, unlike 
typical bonds, annual coupon payments—or interest payments—are 
contingent on the bank’s ability to maintain its capital above required 
levels and if its capital should fall below that threshold, the bank can 
exercise the option not to make the coupon payment.102  As such, coupon 
payments are discretionary, and once skipped, do not get repaid at a later 
date.103  This is where the “bail in” aspect kicks in:  investors can 
potentially “absorb” losses via missed coupon payments, and if 
conversion is triggered, they become shareholders by virtue of a debt-to-
equity conversion.104  Otherwise, the CoCo bonds are canceled entirely if 
regulators deem the bank is failing.105  
IV. BANCO POPULAR’S WIPEOUT AND AN ANALYSIS OF THE 
EFFECTIVENESS OF COCO BONDS IN ABSORBING LOSS AND 
RESCUING FAILING INSTITUTIONS 
A. Inadequacy of a Conversion 
The effectiveness of CoCo bonds in saving an institution from 
failure appears to be thwarted by the instrument’s conversion capacity.106  
Once triggered, a conversion of AT1 capital into equity may not be 
adequate.107  Total regulatory capital consists of Tier 1 capital, which 
 
 101. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 6, at 16.   
 102. Richter, supra note 98 (“When CoCos plunge, it’s a sign investors think those 
thresholds are approaching, that the bank will have to raise more capital by issuing shares 
and/or CoCos. But with both plunging, raising capital that way will be prohibitively 
expensive. So skipping CoCo coupon payments might be the next step to avoid, or delay, 
falling over the bank. That’s what the market is afraid of.”). 
 103. See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 6, at 16 (stipulating that the 
bank must have full discretion at all times to cancel distributions and payments, which means 
the payments are extinguished such that banks are not required to make distributions and 
payments in kind).   
 104. Richter, supra note 98. 
 105. Richter, supra note 98. 
 106. See Acharya et al., supra note 54, at 166 (“[C]ontingent capital is not adequate even 
for containment of ex post distress in all contingencies, especially in the form it is proposed 
whereby there will be a one-time conversion of part of a firm’s debt into equity.  If instead, 
and depending on how deteriorated the conditions are, there was a requirement of progressive 
conversion of debt into equity all the way down the capital structure of financial firms, then 
indeed all firm losses could eventually be passed on to creditors.”). 
 107. See Acharya et al., supra note 54, at 166 (articulating the numerous shortfalls 
associated with CoCo bond conversion). 
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includes CET1 and AT1, as well as Tier 2 capital.108  The Basel 
Committee describes Tier 1 capital as “going concern” capital—capital 
that takes the first and proportionately greatest share of any losses as they 
occur.109  Tier 2, on the other hand, is the supplementary component of 
bank capital and provides loss absorption on a “gone concern.”110  Thus, 
AT1 comprises of only one component in a bank’s capital structure.111  
As such, the amounts of contingent capital are not sufficiently large to 
rescue a bank that is truly at the brink of insolvency, as the converted 
CoCo bonds present only a sliver of a firm’s capital reserves.112 
Instead, a progressive conversion of debt into equity all the way 
down the capital structure of the financial institution is more plausible in 
absorbing the firm’s losses to be passed on to creditors.113  Since AT1 
capital is made up of subordinated and perpetual Tier 1 capital 
instruments issued by a bank that are not included in CET1, the 
contingent conversion would thus only result in converted equity that 
falls within this category of an entire firm’s total capital.114  However, 
even if CoCo bonds were issued with the capacity to convert beyond a 
designated portion of a financial institution’s debt capital structure,115 
CoCo bonds are still limited in the amount of support they can provide to 
an ailing firm to the value of CoCo bonds that are actually issued and 
outstanding.116  Therefore, CoCo bonds, as issued in their current form, 
will probably not be effective or significantly prevent a bank from 
failing.117  
 
 108. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 6, at 12.   
 109. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 6, at 14.   
 110. CADWALADER, supra note 37, at 3; See also Tier 2 Capital, INVESTOPEDIA, http://
www.investopedia.com/terms/t/tier2capital.asp (last visited Sept. 17, 2017) (defining Tier 2 
capital).  
 111. Jeffery, supra note 2. 
 112. See Jeffery, supra note 2 (explaining that contingent capital is comprised of only AT1 
capital and that total regulatory capital consists of not just Tier 1 capital, but also Tier 2 
capital). 
 113. See Acharya et al., supra note 54, at 166 (“[C]ontingent capital is not adequate even 
for containment of ex post distress in all contingencies, especially in the form it is proposed 
whereby there will be a one-time conversion of part of a firm’s debt into equity.”). 
 114. See Jeffery, supra note 2 (describing what comprises AT1 capital). 
 115. See SCOTT, supra note 48, at 195. 
 116. See SCOTT, supra note 48, at 195. 
 117. See Acharya et al., supra note 54, at 166 (arguing that a one-time conversion would 
be ineffective for containment of distress). 
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B. Flaws to the Trigger Point 
Second, the trigger design—arguably the most essential element 
as it kick-starts the CoCo bond’s converting function—varies greatly 
among CoCo bonds issued.118  Whether the contingent capital will 
convert in times of financial stress turns on the choice of the capital-ratio 
trigger:  the triggering event defining the point when the CoCo bonds will 
convert from debt into equity, or alternatively, when the nominal value, 
or principal, is written down.119  
The capital-ratio as related to CoCo bond triggers is the 
comparison between a bank’s core equity capital and its total risk-
weighted assets.120  Under the requirements of Basel III, Tier 1 capital 
instruments must provide for a “going-concern” write-down of principal 
or conversion into equity at a pre-specified trigger point.121  Yet, to date, 
out of the distribution of Tier 1 CoCo bonds by trigger level, the largest 
category—more than 95% of CoCo bonds issued—fall at a conversion 
point of non-viability, according to Moody’s database.122  This is 
alarming as an instrument converting at a PONV trigger point is 
effectively bail-in debt, meaning the institution is at or near a point of 
insolvency and bondholders will have to take a loss on their holdings.123  
The smallest category of CoCo bonds issued fall within conversion at a 
high trigger—a Tier 1 capital ratio of 7% or higher.124  This suggests that 
the bulk of presently issued CoCo bonds will not fulfill their prophylactic 
role in preventing risk ahead of default and creates an impression of a 
 
 118. See AVDJIEV ET AL., supra note 58, at 44 (discussing that CoCos can have one or more 
triggers and describing how the loss absorption of the CoCo can be activated once any trigger 
is breached). 
 119. GLASSERMAN & PEROTTI, supra note 46, at 5. 
 120. See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 6, at 12 (defining capital and 
components of capital and requiring that specific components of an institution’s capital be a 
certain percentage of risk-weighted assets at all times). 
 121. See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 6, at 12, 17 (defining going-
concern Tier 1 Capital as including AT1 capital and that the instruments must absorb loss 
upon breaching a pre-specified trigger point); see also EIGER ET AL., supra note 3 (elaborating 
on the Basel III framework and its criteria that the Tier 1 instruments must be capable of 
principal loss absorption at a pre-specified trigger point). 
 122. GLASSERMAN & PEROTTI, supra note 46, at 5. 
 123. GLASSERMAN & PEROTTI, supra note 46, at 5. 
 124. GLASSERMAN & PEROTTI, supra note 46, at 5.  Moody’s CoCo Monitor shows 19 
banks issue CoCos at a higher trigger level of 7%-8%, 37 banks issue CoCos at a trigger level 
of 4.5%-5.5%, and finally, 109 banks issue CoCos that trigger at the PONV (Note: no U.S. 
banks issue CoCos).  GLASSERMAN & PEROTTI, supra note 46, at 5. 
  
2018] INVESTORS’ TRASH, TAXPAYERS’ TREASURE 421 
general failure of the equity component of CoCo bond debt by way of 
going concern conversion.125  Higher, not lower, CoCo bond triggers are 
ideal as higher triggers while the institution is still a going-concern would 
reduce bank risk-taking as the capital instrument is still viable.126  Thus, 
higher triggers provide additional equity capital at earlier intervention 
points.127  On the other hand, a low trigger, such as the trigger point with 
which 95% of today’s CoCo bonds are issued as mentioned above, is a 
gone concern trigger, meaning the CoCo bonds convert at the PONV.128  
Thus, such low trigger CoCo bonds have lower loss-absorbing 
capacity.129  
The high proportion of low-trigger CoCo bonds to going concern 
CoCo bonds may be attributable to the fact that authorities are generally 
reluctant to trigger conversion.130  An instrument with a discretionary 
trigger is less likely to convert, as discretionary triggers give the bank’s 
national regulator supervisory discretion to determine when the issuer has 
reached the PONV.131  Indeed, issuance of CoCo bonds with a 
discretionary trigger, rather than a mechanical trigger, are more 
commonplace.132  Currently, worldwide issuance with discretionary 
triggers exceeds issuance with strictly mechanical triggers.133  This trend 
weakens the original purpose of CoCo bonds as the greater portion of 
these instruments being issued according to discretion-based triggers 
means there are likely more “unconvertible” CoCo bonds than 
convertible, even in the event of banks hitting low capital ratios.134  
Indeed, a common investor concern regarding discretionary triggers is the 
 
 125. GLASSERMAN & PEROTTI, supra note 46, at 5. 
 126. See AVDJIEV ET AL., supra note 58, at 51 (“All else the same, CoCos with relatively 
low triggers offer more favourable terms to holders of CoCos than to equity holders since the 
trigger is less likely to be breached and the former group is less likely to absorb losses.  By 
contrast . . . equity holders prefer high-trigger CoCos since they are more likely to lead to 
early loss absorption by holders of CoCos.”). 
 127. NERA ECONOMIC CONSULTING, UNDERSTANDING CONTINGENT CONVERTIBLE 
SECURITIES: A PRIMER 2 (2016), http://www.nera.com/content/dam/nera/publications/2016 
/Understanding_Contingent_Convertible_Securities-A_Primer.pdf (explaining what CoCos 
are, their product characteristics, issuance to date, credit ratings, and recent developments). 
 128. SCHMID, supra note 63, at 7. 
 129. AVDJIEV ET AL., supra note 58, at 47. 
 130. GLASSERMAN & PEROTTI, supra note 46, at 6. 
 131. NERA ECONOMIC CONSULTING, supra note 127, at 2. 
 132. GLASSERMAN & PEROTTI, supra note 46, at 6. 
 133. GLASSERMAN & PEROTTI, supra note 46, at 6. 
 134. GLASSERMAN & PEROTTI, supra note 46, at 6. 
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difficulty in predicting the regulator’s use of its discretion.135  Certainly, 
regulatory discretion is always potentially subject to insufficient 
information, ineffective monitoring and political pressures.136  
To investors, safer bonds are characterized by a greater distance 
between the CoCo bond’s trigger point and a bank’s threshold level in 
CET1 ratio.137  The trigger should ideally be set at a high enough capital 
ratio level so that in a trigger event, the issuing bank is still fully viable.138  
However, under a discretionary trigger, the bank’s national regulator will 
call the trigger only upon its determination that the issuing bank has 
reached the PONV.139  Therefore, there is a strong argument for trigger 
levels to be determined by a mechanical trigger, rather than by 
supervisory discretion.140  Yet, the real difference between mechanical 
and discretionary triggers may not be significant, as a mechanical trigger 
still requires an explicit agreement of a bank’s regulator, rendering the 
automatic trigger a de facto discretionary regulatory decision.141  
Practically speaking, then, the two types of triggers are indistinguishable, 
as automatic conversion can only occur once a bank admits to failing to 
satisfy the minimal capital ratio requirement.142  
Even assuming the mechanical trigger approach is pursued, 
calculating the trigger point of capital requires either an accounting-based 
or a market-based approach.143  A market-based trigger takes into account 
 
 135. NERA ECONOMIC CONSULTING, supra note 127, at 2; see HENNING HESSE, COCO 
BONDS AND RISK: THE MARKET VIEW 2 (2016) (“[I]nvestors value CoCo bonds higher when 
the distance to the trigger is high. This shows two things: First, investors are well aware of 
one of the key risk in CoCo bonds. Second, and perhaps more importantly, it supports the 
view that investors think that an automatic trigger event is plausible, rather than thinking that 
a CoCo bond will only be triggered on regulator’s discretion (for example in a bail-in).”).  
 136. Suresh Sundaresan & Zhenyu Wang; On the Design of Contingent Capital with a 
Market Trigger, 70 J. FIN. 881, 883 (discussing the controversial debate over the proper design 
of the trigger component of contingent convertible bonds, namely, whether triggers should be 
determined by accounting ratios, regulatory discretion, or bank management). 
 137. HESSE, supra note 135, at 7. 
 138. EIGER ET AL., supra note 30 (describing the process of setting the trigger point as a 
“delicate balancing act.”). 
 139. NERA ECONOMIC CONSULTING, supra note 127, at 2. 
 140. GLASSERMAN & PEROTTI, supra note 46, at 6. 
 141. See GLASSERMAN & PEROTTI, supra note 46, at 6 (discussing that the distinction 
between discretionary and automatic triggers may be tenuous in practice as automatic 
conversion can only occur once a bank admits it has failed to satisfy the minimum capital 
requirement). 
 142. GLASSERMAN & PEROTTI, supra note 46, at 6. 
 143. GLASSERMAN & PEROTTI, supra note 46, at 5. 
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a bank’s share price or its credit default swap spread.144  An accounting-
based trigger is activated if the institution’s capital ratio drops below a 
specified level.145  An accounting-based trigger is a more backward 
looking approach and may be impractical in its ability to forecast the 
future evolution of the issuing bank’s capital ratio.146  Nevertheless, 
regulators have resisted including any sort of market signal in a CoCo 
bond conversion trigger, and to date, no issued CoCo bond utilizes a 
market-based trigger.147  The consequence of an accounting-based trigger 
without consideration for market information might lead to the possibility 
of even a high-trigger CoCo bond converting too late to provide going-
concern capital if the regulatory accounting numbers fail to reflect the 
bank’s true financial condition.148 
 Indeed, bank failures may unfold too quickly for the bonds’ loss 
mechanisms to kick in.149  The lag resulting from accounting-based 
triggers may be one explanation to Banco Popular’s recent CoCo bond 
wipeout.150  Banco Popular had a total market capitalization of €4 billion 
at the start of 2017, but was forcibly acquired by Spain’s largest bank, 
Banco Santander SA—just as Popular came close to a collapse from bad 
property loans—for just €1 in an overnight auction after the European 
Central Bank (“ECB”) deemed Popular “failing or likely to fail” in June 
2017.151  This was the first time that CoCo bonds have been wiped out.152  
 
 144. GLASSERMAN & PEROTTI, supra note 46, at 6. 
 145. NERA ECONOMIC CONSULTING, supra note 127, at 2. 
 146. NERA ECONOMIC CONSULTING, supra note 127, at 2. 
 147. GLASSERMAN & PEROTTI, supra note 46, at 6. 
 148. See NERA ECONOMIC CONSULTING, supra note 127, at 2 (“For CoCos with 
accounting-based triggers, it may be difficult to forecast the evolution of the issuer’s capital 
ratio.”). 
 149. Neil Unmack, Going Going Gone, REUTERS: BREAKING VIEWS, June 7, 2017, https:/
/www.breakingviews.com/considered-view/popular-wipeout-leaves-coco-bonds-on-
drawing-board/ (explaining why Banco Popular’s wipeout shows CoCo bonds’ value did not 
provide the expected results while highlighting that contagion of investor panic was contained 
which might show that Popular was an isolated case). 
 150. See id. (“One conclusion could be that CoCos are redundant, as bank failures happen 
too quickly for the bonds’ intricate loss mechanisms to swing into action.”). 
 151. Tom Beardsworth, How Spain’s Zombie Bank Rescue Snares Bondholders: 
QuickTake Q&A, BLOOMBERG, June 7, 2017, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2017-06-07/how-spain-s-zombie-bank-rescue-snares-bondholders-quicktake-q-a 
(summarizing the Santander-Banco Popular takeover and why Banco Popular’s junior bonds 
and Tier 1 (CoCo bonds) were completely written off); see also BONDADVISER, supra note 2 
(“[T]he ECB deemed Banco Popular as ‘failing or likely to fail’ and sold the bank to its rival 
Banco Santander for €1 in an overnight auction conducted by the Single Resolution Board.”). 
 152. Beardsworth, supra note 151. 
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Specifically, Banco Popular’s CoCo bonds were wiped out before they 
even triggered.153  Regulators had deemed the bonds non-viable before 
reaching the trigger point.154  Nonetheless, before news of the Santander 
takeover, Popular’s CoCo bonds—a total of €1.25 billion worth of AT1 
bonds—were still trading at around 50% of face value, suggesting a high 
probability of loss, but still not at the point of a wipeout.155  Further, the 
bonds issued by Popular consisted of €750 million of CoCo bonds that 
were due to be converted into equity when its CET1 ratio dropped below 
7%, and another €500 million that would convert at 5.125%.156  Thus, 
Popular issued CoCo bonds with patently conservative, Basel III-
compliant trigger points, and yet their non-viability before reaching the 
trigger points indicated a lag in the instruments’ ability to react to 
institutional failure in a timely manner.157  Due to Popular’s lack of 
liquidity and inability to meet short term obligations, ECB stepped in and 
called for the trigger of the bonds as at a PONV.158  
Therefore, Popular demonstrates that a financial institution’s 
reported capital levels are more ambiguous than useful for investors.159  
Bank failures are typically attributable to a sudden shortage of liquidity 
rather than capital.160  Indeed, despite what the reported CET1 ratios for 
Popular may have been prior to the Santander acquisition, some models 
suggest that Popular’s real CET1 at the time of its resolution was negative 
2%, as implied by the write-downs made by Santander.161  Thus, Popular 
could serve as a cautionary tale that when a bank faces crises, its capital 
levels are not only misleading in providing a sense of security, but have 
minimal utility for investors.162  Popular demonstrated that while its 
 
 153. Unmack, supra note 149. 
 154. Unmack, supra note 149. 
 155. Unmack, supra note 149. 
 156. Matei Rosca, CoCo Calculations Change as Flops Bring Bank Risks to Forefront, 
S&P GLOBAL, Aug. 3, 2017 (discussing that the outcome of CoCo bonds by way of Banco 
Popular and BremerLB have shown them to be riskier than analysts have perceived). 
 157. See Unmack, supra note 149 (“The Spanish lender’s failure and rescue by rival 
Santander did not provide the expected test for bonds which convert into equity under stress: 
the securities were wiped out before they could be triggered.”). 
 158. BONDADVISER, supra note 2. 
 159. Rosca, supra note 156. 
 160. Unmack, supra note 149. 
 161. Rosca, supra note 156. 
 162. Rosca, supra note 156. 
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market capitalization indicated value to investors,163 it in reality 
encountered a liquidity crisis and subsequently could not pay off the debt 
instruments.164  
More importantly, Popular’s wipeout is revealing of the 
unpredictable nature of discretionary triggers.165  Popular’s issues 
stemmed from its heaping pool of nonperforming loans made on the eve 
of a housing crash, which took up a large portion of its capital buffers.166  
This led to the lack of liquidity which caused ECB to declare the bonds 
non-viable, effectively canceling them.167  Yet, up to that point, regulators 
did not instruct it to stop making payments on its CoCo bonds despite 
having broad discretion and in light of the bank nearing insolvency.168  
Fear of triggering runs and causing sudden shortages of liquidity are 
likely to make executives and regulators apprehensive of taking any sort 
of action that might undermine confidence, including canceling coupon 
payments.169  As it happens, regulators, in facilitating the Popular 
acquisition, completely bypassed the pre-determined trigger points of 7% 
and 5.125%,170 which were contractually set, for Popular’s bonds in order 
to write off the bonds completely.171  With no warning and not a single 
coupon payment missed, bondholders and investors were arguably blind-
 
 163. See Rosca, supra note 156 (“As Popular . . . demonstrated, a bank may have an 
adequate capital ratio but still encounter a liquidity crunch that means it cannot pay the debt.”). 
 164. Rosca, supra note 156. 
 165. See Unmack, supra note 149 (discussing that regulators deemed Popular non-viable 
before any of the trigger points in the CoCo bonds were reached); see also NERA ECONOMIC 
CONSULTING, supra note 127, at 2 (explaining that it may be difficult to predict regulators’ 
use of its discretion in triggering the CoCo bonds).  
 166. Lisa Abramowicz, The Untested $181 Billion Bank Safety Net, BLOOMBERG 
QUICKTAKE, June 6, 2017, https://www.bloomberg.com/gadfly/articles/2017-06-06/banco-
popular-could-use-a-little-help-from-its-cocos (describing Banco Popular as an idiosyncratic 
case and the arising uncertainties for a $181 billion pool of contingent convertible debt 
globally). 
 167. Unmack, supra note 149. 
 168. Abramowicz, supra note 166; see also NERA ECONOMIC CONSULTING, supra note 
127, at 2 (“[E]ven when an issuer is able and willing to make interest payments on AT1 
CoCos, it could be prevented from doing so by the regulator.”). 
 169. Unmack, supra note 149. 
 170. Rosca, supra note 156; JOHN KRIZ & JOE URCIUOLI, SPECTRUM ASSET MANAGEMENT, 
BANCO POPULAR POST MORTEM: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE AT1 MARKET (2017), https://
www.samipfd.com/935220.pdf.  
 171. See BONDADVISER, supra note 1 (“ECB’s action stemmed from Popular’s lack of 
liquidity (i.e. inability to meet short term obligations) and hence, the Point Of Non-Viability 
(PONV) was triggered.  As a result, all existing shares (Common Equity Tier 1) and 
Additional Tier 1 (AT1) instruments were cancelled.”). 
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sided, literally taking a loss overnight.172  Given the unpredictability of 
regulatory action and other previously mentioned factors such as political 
pressures,173 bonds such as those of Popular’s will continue to hold an 
element of uncertainty and volatility. 
Nonetheless, given the attenuated difference between mechanical 
and discretionary triggers and the fact that they are de facto 
indistinguishable, the search for a more dependable type of trigger is 
likely futile and highlights an area of ambiguity in CoCo bonds that 
should not be ignored.174 
C. Systemic Contagion 
Even if CoCo bonds converted at its pre-specified trigger points 
without regulatory action—before a bank’s true capital ratio renders the 
bonds non-viable—conversion of the instruments may create incidental 
damage aside from saving a failing institution.175  The actual act of 
conversion, once triggered, could spark or intensify contagion as existing 
creditors and potential investors might interpret the conversion of 
contingent capital into equity in one institution as a transmission signal 
of fatal distress for their own institutions or for the financial system as a 
whole.176  Indeed, conversion of an institution’s CoCo bonds signals to 
depositors that the institution’s asset quality has deteriorated.177  After all, 
 
 172. Beardsworth, supra note 151. 
 173. Analysts commented that authorities’ actions in stepping in to wind down Popular 
and safeguard its assets gives the eurozone authorities new credibility after questions were 
raised during a tortuous struggle to clean up Italy’s troubled banks.  In June 2017, an 
agreement to rescue Italian Monte dei Paschi di Siena bank came about, after close to 18 
months of discussion over ways to restructure and bail out Italy’s weakest banks, during which 
Bank of Italy governor criticized European banking authorities for “decision making 
processes relatively incompatible with rapid intervention” and lack of effective coordination.  
Tobias Buck, Santander Takes Over ‘Failing’ Rival Banco Popular After EU Steps In, FIN. 
TIMES, June 7, 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/4cf8a400-4b4b-11e7-a3f4-c742b9791d43; 
see Alex Barker, Brussels and Rome Seal Rescue Deal for Monte dei Paschi, FIN. TIMES, June 
1, 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/3c6e3cb8-46ae-11e7-8519-9f94ee97d996 (describing 
the agreement to rescue Monte dei Paschi di Siena bank after drawn-out discussions regarding 
the restructuring of the Italian bank, which includes both investor bail-in and injection of 
capital using public funds approved by the EU). 
 174. GLASSERMAN & PEROTTI, supra note 46, at 6 (discussing that the distinction between 
discretionary and automatic triggers is tenuous in practice). 
 175. Smith, supra note 10. 
 176. SCOTT, supra note 48, at 194. 
 177. STEPHANIE CHAN & SWEDER VAN WIJNBERGEN, COCOS, CONTAGION AND SYSTEMIC 
RISK 2 (2014), https://papers.tinbergen.nl/14110.pdf (analyzing how CoCo conversion leads 
to higher systemic risk).  
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these AT1 bonds should ideally convert only when the bank’s capital 
ratio hits a certain point ahead of default.178 
However, the aftermath of the Popular trauma may have eased 
concern that investors would panic when a CoCo bond wipes out, thus 
creating a domino effect of contagion to other lenders.179  After the 
wipeout of the Popular bonds, there appeared to be little spillover into the 
remainder of the market.180  Other AT1 securities were quickly buying 
and selling at higher ranges, including debt issued by other Spanish banks 
and one bank’s CoCo bonds—those of CaixaBank—were trading at 
higher prices just hours after the demise of the Popular bonds.181  As such, 
the market rally after Popular’s wipeout signified containment of post-
wipeout “contagion.”182  Some argue that this was an indication of 
healthy CoCo bond functionality and that the lack of contagion in 
investor panic manifested the instrument’s success.183  
Lending credence to this argument, and ignoring the fact that the 
bonds were completely canceled before Popular was acquired, regulators’ 
apparent reluctance to trigger a bail-in in Popular’s scenario still raises an 
integral question:  How effective of a buffer were $181 billion in CoCo 
bonds?184  As long as bank assets are positively correlated, there remains 
the possibility of a CoCo bond conversion in one bank leading to investor 
panic in another bank.185  As such, a CoCo bond conversion can create 
negative externality, leading to investor anxiety, and greater likelihood of 
bank runs by alarmed depositors.186  Conversion inevitably signals to 
 
 178. AVDJIEV ET AL., supra note 57, at 46. 
 179. Smith, supra note 10. 
 180. Smith, supra note 10. 
 181. Smith, supra note 10. 
 182. Smith, supra note 10. 
 183. Smith, supra note 10. 
 184. Abramowicz, supra note 166. 
 185. CHAN & VAN WIJNBERGEN, supra note 177, at 46. 
 186. CHAN & VAN WIJNBERGEN, supra note 177, at 46.  Even if a conversion has not been 
triggered, the Basel Committee proposal on bail-ins limits bail-in conversion to noncommon 
Tier 1 and Tier II capital instruments only.  This may reduce the danger of setting off a run or 
spreading contagion, since short-term debt would be protected, because short-term debt is 
excluded from conversion being that it is not a capital instrument.  However, limiting the 
selection of bailable instruments to Tier I and Tier II capital only, could restrict the total 
amount of capital potentially available to absorb losses, limiting the usefulness of bail-ins to 
circumstances where institutional losses do not exceed existing capital.  Short-term investors 
who suspect that their issuer’s long-term debt and common equity are insufficient to facilitate 
the recapitalization will expect to be impaired as well, and may run anyway.  SCOTT, supra 
note 48, at 197–98. 
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depositors that asset quality has worsened and as a consequence, the 
probability of a bank run likely goes up—the opposite outcome of what 
CoCo bonds are designed to create.187  
In February of 2016, Deutsche Bank’s share price saw a dramatic 
drop causing investors to flee the bank’s bonds, heeding warnings from 
analysts that Deutsche Bank might not be able to afford interest payments 
on its CoCo bonds.188  Indeed, the plunge in Deutsche Bank’s share price 
created an adverse chain reaction amongst nervous investors, resulting in 
a “self-feeding cycle of falling prices.”189  Some argue that unlike in 
2016, when there was market fear of Deutsche Bank missing its coupon 
payments, Banco Popular had less of a systemic reach than Deutsche 
Bank in the size and scope of its operations.190  But Deutsche Bank should 
not serve as a security blanket supporting the view that Banco Popular’s 
contagion containment is an isolated instance.191  In the event of an actual 
bank run, CoCo bonds will not satisfy systemic demand for liquidity, 
therefore contingent capital can never serve as a useful tool for rescuing 
financial institutions affected by contagion.192  As such, a mass 
conversion of the CoCo bonds of any significantly sized financial 
institution should not be taken lightly, and in addition, regulators’ 
discretionary decisions to trigger bail-ins and continue allowance of 
coupon payments offers little assurance to current and potential investors 
that other institutions are not also undergoing financial stress.193  
 
 187. CHAN & VAN WIJNBERGEN, supra note 177, at 3.  In the United States, bank runs will 
likely not be as much of a concern due to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(“FDIC”).  The FDIC provides government-guaranteed deposit insurance and so depositors 
have no incentive to start a run on the bank when they will not suffer losses when a bank fails, 
provided that the bank has FDIC insurance.  See BROOME & MARKHAM, supra note 6, at 157. 
 188. Tim Wallace, German Finance Minister and Bank Chief Insist: Deutsche is ‘Rock 
Solid’, THE TELEGRAPH, Feb. 9, 2016, 6:31 PM, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance 
/newsbysector/banksandfinance/12148961/German-finance-minister-and-bank-chief-insist-
Deutsche-is-rock-solid.html (explaining the market panic induced by Deutsche Bank’s shares 
falling in price and how it has compelled bank’s management to reassure investors that the 
bank is still stable). 
 189. Id. 
 190. Abramowicz, supra note 166. 
 191. See SCOTT, supra note 48, at 194 (discussing that conversion events might well 
intensify contagion). 
 192. SCOTT, supra note 48, at 194. 
 193. See SCOTT, supra note 48, at 194 (“Since contingent capital does not satisfy the 
systemic demand for liquidity during a run, it can never serve as a useful tool for rescuing 
financial institutions affected by contagion.  Proponents of contingent capital instruments who 
appreciate this limitation acknowledge the necessity of interim liquidity facilities, organized 
privately or in all likelihood by a public lender of last resort to steward issuers through a 
period of systemic crisis.”).  The Deutsche AT1 incident subsided only after concerted action 
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D. Inherent Risks to Investors 
Finally, CoCo bonds carry a great deal of inherent risk for their 
investors.194  CoCo bonds as a hybrid debt instrument are designed to 
resemble equity by either automatically converting into equity or writing 
off its face value upon a trigger event.195  Currently, there are more write-
down CoCo bonds being issued than there are CoCo bonds that convert 
to equity, according to Moody’s CoCo Monitor data.196  Both forms of 
conversions technically reduce leverage and could thus act as a tool in 
reducing risk taking, but overall there is no research consensus on the 
merits of the two types of conversion structures as compared to each 
other.197  
In any case, the risky nature of CoCo bonds compels investors to 
understand the form of loss absorption the CoCo bond takes on when the 
trigger is reached.198  Conversion into equity should, in principle, be a 
better choice for investors as it would offer the possibility of value from 
a stock investment,199 whereas the value of write-down CoCo bonds goes 
 
by the bank’s management and decision to buy back its own bonds, as well as limitation of 
its CoCos to institutional portfolios.  However, its importance should not be minimized as the 
cause of turmoil was uncertainty about receiving coupon payments and investors’ fear that 
they would be holding perpetual bonds with no coupon payments forever—a possibility that 
lies and continues to be at the discretion of the bank or the supervisors.  EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT, supra note 86, at 9. 
 194. See Beardsworth, supra note 151 (“Shareholders always lose when banks fail . . . .”).  
 195. GLASSERMAN & PEROTTI, supra note 46, at 1. 
 196. GLASSERMAN & PEROTTI, supra note 46, at 3.  The issuance of write-down CoCo 
bonds in Europe, the U.K., and in the Asia Pacific region substantially exceeds that of 
convertible CoCos.  GLASSERMAN & PEROTTI, supra note 46, at 3. 
 197. GLASSERMAN & PEROTTI, supra note 46, at 4.  There is no distinction in the regulatory 
treatment between conversion-to-equity and writedown CoCos, although some research 
shows that issuing conversion-to-equity CoCos has a negative impact on issuer’s credit 
default swap spreads, while issuing CoCos with a principal writedown has less of an impact.  
STEFAN AVDJIEV ET AL., COCO BOND ISSUANCE AND BANK FUNDING COSTS 35 (2015) 
[hereinafter COCO BOND ISSUANCE AND BANK FUNDING COSTS], https://bfi.uchicago.edu/
sites/default/files/research/Bolton_CoCos%202015-06-10%2C%20v2.pdf.  This is 
attributable to the fact that conversion to equity increases the cost of risk-taking for current 
shareholders and management due to equity dilution.  Id. at 28.  Aside from the impact on 
bank funding costs, however, there appears to be no regulatory distinction.  Id. at 3.  “Even 
though principal writedown contracts have different incentive effects than equity-conversion 
contracts, they are treated equally by regulators . . . [and] there are no theoretical analyses that 
compare the two conversion mechanisms.”  Id. 
 198. See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 6, at 17 (stipulating that 
loss-absorption must take the form of either a write-down mechanism or equity conversion). 
 199. See AVDJIEV ET AL., supra note 58, at 46 (discussing the different conversion rates for 
conversion-to-equity CoCo bondholders). 
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to zero.200  However, CoCo bonds converting into equity results in 
dilution of return for existing shareholders.201  This may lead to stronger 
incentives for the financial institution to take cavalier actions in creating 
stronger incentives for CoCo bond investors, such as gambling through 
riskier, higher-return investments.202  On the other hand, investors of 
write-down CoCo bonds would receive nothing upon reaching a trigger 
point, just as in the Banco Popular wipeout.203  Compared to equity 
conversion, write-down CoCo bonds may be less disruptive but, in any 
write-down scenario—whether a permanent write off or a temporary 
write down—the investors still could face permanent loss if the bank’s 
capital ratio never improves.204  And as Banco Popular illustrates, 
shareholders always lose when banks fail.205  Banco Popular’s total 
market capitalization was $4.5 billion at the beginning of 2017 and had 
declined to zero by the time of its acquisition by Santander, as evidenced 
by the €1 purchase price.206  The investors in the CoCo bonds and Banco 
Popular’s shareholders, in consequence, received nothing.207  For 
contingent capital instruments that result in permanent write-downs after 
a triggering event, the write-off results in an increase in retained earnings 
for the issuer and always a loss for the instrument holder.208 
Principal aside, coupon payments are another concern for CoCo 
bond investors. Regulators may suspend or limit coupon payments if they 
deem a bank’s capital to be nearing a certain threshold near or above the 
trigger point, thereby affecting the bond’s principal.209  As briefly 
 
 200. Beardsworth, supra note 151. 
 201. COCO BOND ISSUANCE AND BANK FUNDING COSTS, supra note 197, at 28–29 
(“Conversion to equity increases the cost of risk taking for current shareholders and 
management due to equity dilution.”). 
 202. GLASSERMAN & PEROTTI, supra note 46, at 4. 
 203. Beardsworth, supra note 151. 
 204. See Beardsworth, supra note 151 (explaining how in Banco Popular’s acquisition, 
bondholders received nothing as the bonds were written down completely, and Tier 2 
holders—holders of junior notes—also received nothing from a conversion as Banco Popular 
was sold for a nominal amount). 
 205. Beardsworth, supra note 151. 
 206. Beardsworth, supra note 151. 
 207. Beardsworth, supra note 151. 
 208. FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, supra note 46, at 18.  This is because rather than 
having to issue common equity as the issuing bank would do under a debt-to-equity CoCo 
conversion, the alternative feature of writing off the nominal value has the effect of 
extinguishing the issuing bank’s outstanding debt entirely. As such, the amount of loss-
absorption could be equal to the full face amount of the instrument.  FIN. STABILITY 
OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, supra note 46, at 18.   
 209. Turner, supra note 93. 
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mentioned earlier, the 2016 market scare revolving around whether 
Deutsche Bank would be able to pay its coupons on its CoCo bonds as it 
approached the threshold for required capital showcased investor 
confusion and frenzy arising from uncertainty over CoCo bonds.210  As 
Deutsche Bank’s shares plunged in late 2016, hitting a three-decade low, 
its €1.75 billion bond’s falling price induced a panic among investors 
over whether Deutsche Bank would be skipping CoCo bond coupon 
payments.211  But even if coupon or principal payments were not missed, 
this is likely not a reliable indicator of an institution’s safety and 
soundness.212  None of Banco Popular’s AT1 bonds had incurred losses 
for investors, either in terms of missed principal or coupon payments.213  
Yet, the bonds’ real price dropped to zero at the call of the authorities.214 
All in all, to absorb loss, CoCo bonds must be responsive to the 
health of an institution, so the coupon payments are optional and the 
bonds themselves are perpetual.215  This means CoCo bonds will not 
mature unless the bank exercises an option, which is typically after five 
years.216  While investors’ early presumptions may have been that banks 
would almost always take up the option to redeem its CoCo bonds, 
regulators may not allow banks to exercise the option to redeem the bonds 
if its low capital ratio requires having to issue new bonds at higher 
costs.217  Therefore, for investors, this means the risk of losing their initial 
investment in addition to missed coupon payments never really goes 
away.218 
 
 210. Richter, supra note 98. 
 211. Frances Coppola, Deutsche Bank: A Sinking Ship?, FORBES (Sept. 27, 2016), https://
www.forbes.com/sites/francescoppola/2016/09/27/deutsche-bank-a-sinking-ship/
#367d72873805 (emphasizing the impending trouble Deutsche Bank was in, leading to 
worries that the bank would be unable to pay its coupons or that the bonds would have to be 
bailed in). 
 212. See Smith, supra note 10 (discussing that while no Banco Popular CoCo bonds had 
ever incurred losses for investors prior to the wipeout, the bonds’ real price was at one point, 
“zero”). 
 213. See Smith, supra note 10 (“No AT1 bond has yet incurred losses for investors, either 
in terms of missed principal or coupon payments.”). 
 214. Hale & McCrum, supra note 74. 
 215. Hale & McCrum, supra note 74. 
 216. Hale & McCrum, supra note 74. 
 217. Hale & McCrum, supra note 74. 
 218. See Turner, supra note 93 (“[I]nvestors have to rely not only on the issuer’s 
performing well but also on the favorability of ‘exogenous factors’ such as a lack of 
‘regulatory intrusion’ . . . .”). 
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Moreover, regulators’ discretionary involvement creates yet 
another area of uncertainty and poses as an exogenous factor to 
investors.219  As previously mentioned, what currently triggers a CoCo 
bond’s conversion, whether it be a principal write-down or an equity 
conversion, depends on the capital ratio of the institution.220  Regulatory 
behavior may well affect the calculation of the institution’s capital 
ratio.221  Indeed, regulators may raise the risk weightings of assets which 
could effectively cut a bank’s capital ratio, even if the bank’s capital 
remains stable.222  With this additional wild card factor for investors, the 
risks CoCo bonds pose to its holders render more confusion and hassle 
than the high-yields—if any yield at all—are worth.223   
V. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The current landscape for CoCo bonds is one without a global 
consensus.224  If CoCo bonds remain as an avenue to rescue failing 
institutions, international coordination will be required to ensure 
institutions have an equal competitive landscape so that regulatory 
arbitrage is averted.225  Reform in the trigger system may be most 
palpable in refining the efficacy of the CoCo bond instrument in 
absorbing loss.226  A rule-based system-wide trigger as opposed to an 
institutional-level trigger would more likely address systemic risk-
taking.227  A rule-based trigger allows for anticipation, whereas a trigger 
event at the discretion of regulators would likely produce adverse news 
 
 219. Turner, supra note 93. 
 220. See supra Part IV.B. 
 221. Turner, supra note 93. 
 222. Turner, supra note 93.  Regulators in recent years have increased the risk weightings 
of assets.  Doing so will reduce a bank’s capital ratio, even if a bank’s capital remains stable.  
In 2014, regulators did just that with Danske Bank: raising the risk weights due to the 
Copenhagen bank’s mortgage loans from 2013 cut its capital ratio by more than a percentage 
point.  Turner, supra note 93. 
 223. See Turner, supra note 93 (describing the role regulators have played in the past as 
perceived by investors as a “sudden-death quality” and making investors wary). 
 224. Acharya et al., supra note 54, at 144. 
 225. Acharya et al., supra note 54, at 144; see INT’L SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES ASS’N, INC., 
supra note 18 (indicating that some of the most significant changes of Basel III have yet to be 
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 226. See GLASSERMAN & PEROTTI, supra note 46, at 4 (making note of academic research 
advocating for different trigger mechanisms); see also STIJN VAN NIEUWERBURGH, 
REWRITING FINANCIAL REGULATION 42 (2009), http://govtpolicyrecs.stern.nyu.edu/docs/w 
hitepapers_ebook_chapter_9.pdf (advocating for a rule-based reform to the trigger system). 
 227. NIEUWERBURGH, supra note, at 43. 
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and an information contagion to the market, causing a downward 
spiral.228  Further, the required capitalization below which conversion is 
triggered should be measured based on market measures of equity, rather 
than book measures of equity.229  Accounting-based measures, as 
previously mentioned, often lag in reflecting the true capitalization of 
firms, which is the most likely explanation behind Banco Popular’s 
wipeout.230  
Until this fundamental change to the conversion trigger is made 
to CoCo bonds, they will continue to be exotic, impractical instruments 
for investors.231  But most importantly, the bonds will be ineffective in 
rescuing troubled institutions without government or public 
intervention.232 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The demise of Banco Popular reveals the true characteristics of 
CoCo bonds when put to the test.  Banco Popular’s takeover was the first 
time the hybrid debt instruments wiped out, revealing both the bonds’ 
ability to absorb loss as required by international regulatory standards, 
but not without the expense of bondholders through unpredictable loss-
absorption mechanisms.233  The bonds demonstrated first and foremost 
the inadequacy of conversion to wholly rescue a bank from failure.  
Second, Banco Popular shed light on the complex trigger system, how 
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regulator discretion impacted the loss-absorption process, and the futility 
of any reform in the same.  Further, an ex post accounting of Banco 
Popular’s capital levels revealed the delay of the bonds’ loss-absorption 
mechanisms.234  Finally, the optional coupon payments, permanent write-
downs, unpredictable regulatory behavior, and possibility of contagion 
are aspects of CoCo bonds that create unavoidable, incidental risks to 
investors.  On the other hand, the Banco Popular investors’ losses can be 
viewed as a win for taxpayers as the sale of Banco Popular was facilitated 
without bail-out assistance.235   
The €1 buyout, while disappointingly insignificant to investors, 
is arguably priceless for taxpayers that may have had to fund Banco 
Popular’s rescue were it not for the bonds being written down.  Although 
not quite junk bonds, CoCo bonds may have proven to be investors’ trash, 
but as it turns out, taxpayers’ treasure. 
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